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Richard Sylvan, a vanguard in the field of environmental philosophy published a book
in 1994 with David Bennett titled The Greening of Ethics. Nearly twenty-five years later,
where the environmental situation of our world is even more serious, and where some
governments deny the existence and negative effects of human caused climate change, the
greening of ethics is even more urgent. In this paper, I will revisit Sylvan’s and Bennett’s
work arguing that their approach to environmental ethics should be one that is advocated.
I consider the most salient features of their approach, how this translates into practice but
also offer an analysis as to why some governments have reached an impasse in regard to
implementing environmental policies, and why environmental ethics still remains on the
margins. In the final section of this paper, I will discuss what an effective practice would
mean.
The greening of ethics begins with the understanding of ethics itself, and how limit-
ing the understanding of the concept, will limit how it is then thought of, theorised and
practiced. For Sylvan, environmental ethics had become truncated. Can we say the same
today? Maybe not to the same extent, but we can definitely say that many environmental
policies have become truncated. Much progress has been made, the signing of the Paris
Agreement in 2015 saw 197 countries willing to commit to combatting climate change.
However, despite these efforts, many countries (including the U.S.A and Australia) have
not adequately responded to the global crisis. Another feature worth exploring is the notion
of greening, which for Sylvan requires some form of commitment to working towards miti-
gating environmental degradation of the complete ecosystem. This starts at the individual
level, and extends to the responsibilities of states.
The greening of ethics is not just another form of applied ethics, it is agent orientated,
and essential for its success is fruitful practice. A redistribution of values is necessary for
a real greening of ethics, and Sylvan’s theory of intrinsic value is helpful in understanding
the force behind this. The practice in deep-green theory goes beyond the application of
the theory, it requires a shift in beliefs and values. Sylvan, as a talented logician, meta-
physician and environmental philosopher brings to environmental philosophy theoretical
strengths from all these areas, and something could be said about the interconnectedness
and strength of such a philosophical scheme. This cannot be understated, and provides his
environmental ethic with a richness that is unique. Some time will be dedicated to think-
ing about Sylvan’s and Plumwood’s Deep-green theory, and the appropriateness of pushing
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forward this particular theory as opposed to deep ecology. Sylvan argued that some forms
of environmental ethics were quite shallow and hence, ineffective in transforming individual
and social change. Unfortunately, a shallow environmental ethic is still the most dominant
type of environmental ethic reflected in the environmental policies of countries such as the
U.S. and Australia (Sylvan and Bennett, 1994).
Understanding ethics
To begin to consider what environmental ethics is, could be and should be, some under-
standing of what we mean by “ethics” is needed. As Sylvan and Bennett (1994) noted,
“without a characterization of ethics, a satisfactory account of environmental ethics and
its roles is remote,” (p.9). Ethics is too often, relegated to the sphere of the individual
and thus is threatened by relativist justifications. But, as Sylvan and Bennett (1994) as-
sert, ethics does mean the guiding moral principles of an individual, but also denotes the
‘characteristic spirit of a community’ (p.9). So, ethics becomes something which guides in-
dividual lives but also the appropriate actions of a moral community. What is often missed
about this characterization is the notion that when contemplating ethical principles, one
must consider both the theoretical and practical applications. The tension between the
theoretical and practical is dialectical, so it is essential to work with this tension. For
Sylvan the term applied ethics could be considered a pleonasm of a popular sort. The true
meaning of ethics lies in the application of governing principles, such as doing no harm,
acts of beneficence, etc..1 For Dennis Goulet, a development ethicist, the concept of ethics
transcends the theoretical, “Genuine ethics ... a kind of praxis which generates critical re-
flection on the value charge of ones social action” (1997, p.1165). The theory and practice
are inextricably linked. The result of this is public action.
Another characteristic of ethics which has caused much controversy, is the way it has
been confined to our relationships with other humans only. In the field of environmental
ethics, primarily due to the urgent need to do so, there is now awareness that we must
also consider non-human beings, the biotic community in its totality. The shift from
anthropocentrism to a more holistic, biotic paradigm is crucial not only for environmental
ethics, but for ethics in general.
The Greening of Ethics
The need for ethics in regard to the environment is not new. For many years now, thinking
about the environment from an ethical dimension has not only been deemed valuable, but
also necessary. And particularly so, now, as the world witnesses a global environmental
crisis, resultant of the effects of human based activity. The evidence is there. Scientists
1How one defines harm or beneficence is subject to relativist notions, this is not an issue of concern in
this paper.
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know that since the beginning of the industrial revolution in the 18th century, global
warming has increased in disproportionate amounts compared to what may be considered
normal fluctuations. And this has only increased as countries all over the world have
endeavoured to become more industrialized.
Sylvan and Bennett (1994) talk about the reluctant greening of ethics and the way
humans although completely dependent on the environment for our existence and conti-
nuity have exploited the environment for our own benefit with little consideration for the
ecosystem as a whole. They say, “Human creatures, like others, depend on a satisfactory
environment for their well-being and their very survival. But in their dealings with it,
so-called developed societies have learned hubris, not wisdom,” (p.6). Some of the reasons
for thinking about the greening of ethics include human chauvinism, translated into con-
trol and domination by humans of non-human species as well as forests, rivers, and the
treatment of the environment as something available to our disposal, to be manipulated
and exploited without repercussion. This is like saying that someone who has been re-
peatedly tortured or even witnessed gross violations against human dignity will weather no
damaging or long-term physical or psychological effects. A constant, repeated harm to a
subject, whether human or non-human, which includes, land, river, forests and so on, can
only result in harm to the subject’s ontological existence.
As humans, there is an urgent need for realizing that as a species, we are only one
among many, that our existence is interdependent and inter-related with other species, just
as much as other non-human species are with us. “Once again humans need to remember
that they need other species more than other species need them. Humans are more likely
to miss rainforests than rainforests are likely to miss humans” (Sylvan and Bennett, p.115).
And maybe it’s not so much the case that we don’t realize it, but that we don’t want to
accept it, or value the importance of it. There is a need to refrain from treating other
non-human species and the environment as mere objects.
In philosophy, for centuries, moral concern has been primarily limited to humans. “The
non-human world did not qualify in and of itself as an object of moral concern or even as the
sort of thing that could be considered for inclusion” (p. 7). However, as Sylvan and Bennett
(1994) say, this notion has become increasingly contentious with the rise of environmental
philosophy and ethics. It has also given rise to different levels of environmental ethics.
Sylvan and Bennett describe them as shallow, intermediate and deep.
A shallow form of environmental ethics, is anthropocentric. The treatment of the en-
vironment is always measured by the extent of interference this has for the interest of
humans. Non-human species and the environment hold instrumental value only. Their
value, lies in the interests and concerns of humans. Sylvan and Bennett (1994) consider
two arguments: prudential and instrumental that uphold a shallow environmental ethic.
The prudential argument pleas for the prudent treatment of the environment but only as a
way to benefit humans. “Prudential arguments are arguments encouraging humans to ex-
ercise wisdom, but mainly the wisdom of protecting human interests” (p.64). Instrumental
arguments about nature and the environment provide justification for the instrumental use
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of the environment for the benefits of humans.
Intermediate forms of environmental ethics do not limit the notion that humans alone
are of value. This position will acknowledge the value of non-human species and other
elements of the environment such as rivers, trees, and mountains, however only second
to human concerns. Sylvan and Bennett named this type of argument relevant here as
extension arguments. They offer two examples, Aldo Leopold’s land ethic and the Argu-
ment from Marginal Cases. These arguments are important for two reasons. First, they
reject the ’sole value assumption’ that only humans have value, and second, they extend
the ethical framework already established to non-human beings. In the discussion about
Leopold, “He recognized that items in the natural environment, such as a biotic community,
have value-in-themselves as well as or despite any value they may have for humans,” (p.
76). A second extension principle of Leopold’s land ethic extends the ethical community
to include the entire ecosystem. In Leopold’s words, “The land ethic simply enlarges the
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively
the land” (p.77). Some have criticised Leopold’s stance by noting that since some entities
included in Leopold’s biotic community cannot reciprocate moral obligations, then they
cannot be deemed part of the ethical community. Callicott and other defenders of Leopold
have stated, that reciprocity of moral obligations is not a necessary condition for being
considered a part of an ethical community. This should not lessen the moral obligation we
have towards them (Sylvan and Bennett, 1994).
The Argument from Marginal Cases comes from Peter Singer, a staunch advocate of
animal liberation. His argument based on utilitarian principles claims that because non-
human beings suffer, as humans do, then we should treat them as we do humans. This
argument arose in response to the appalling treatment and abuse of animals in medical
and scientific research, but also for the ways in which animals are treated in the entire
food production process. Singer also argues against speciesism claiming that we must also
give equal consideration to non-human beings too. Singer does recognize that there are
differences between humans and non-human beings, however these differences do not justify
the abuse and treatment of non-human beings by humans. He says, “there are important
differences between humans and other animals, and these differences must give rise to some
differences in the rights that each have. Recognizing this obvious fact, however, is no barrier
to the case for extending the basic principles of equality to non-human animals” (Sylvan
and Bennett, 1994, p. 86). Sylvan and Bennett argue that these extension arguments are
important for provoking a change in attitudes. Recognizing the interests of others, such
as non-human beings is significant for extending moral considerations to them without
discounting differences.
Sylvan’s main criticism of both extension arguments is that they do not go far enough.
Although, Leopold’s land ethic extends the boundaries of the ethical community it is still
within an ethical framework embedded in humanism. The ethical framework that gives
rise to its application needs to be further extended to include non-sentient beings as well,
such as the rivers, forests, mountains, and so on. In other words, other entities within
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our ecosystem also have intrinsic value, not just humans. The departure of the ethical
framework is non-anthropocentric. This will be further discussed in the next sections on
deep environmental ethics and Sylvan’s deep-green theory.
A Deep Environmental Ethic
Two distinct features set a deep environmental ethic apart from shallow and intermediate
ones. First, the rejection that only humans have value,2 and second, rejecting the notion
that it is only humans that matter, that humans will always outweigh the value of other
non-human entities. One of the most salient features of this ethic is that it demands
a level of accountability on the part of humans, for the ways we treat and exploit our
surrounds. As Sylvan and Bennett say, “In light of the short-term exploitative position,
this means that humans are accountable for their treatment of the environment and things
in it, but also, that they can no longer justify by a spurious sense of moral superiority their
environmentally destructive conveniences and whims” (p. 91). Many people may find this
unsettling, and thus, may consider that this places too great an ethical burden on them.
However, as Sylvan and Bennett (1994) pointed out 24 years ago now, and is even more
urgent today, “An environmental ethic or philosophy must be viable as well as consistent
with environmental and ecological principles. This is exactly what the environmental
crisis is forcing Western societies to face the current treatment of the environment is not
viable. Furthermore, for humans to promote their own survival by the destruction of the
environment and other species is no more than an imperious delusion” (p.91). For an
environmental ethic to be viable, its principles must be able to be translated into action.
It is very much a practical ethic.
The Deep Ecology theory put forward by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess has ac-
quired many followers over the years, but also critics. At the core of the deep ecology
movement is ‘ecosophy’ an attempt to create an awareness, an attitude, a way of life that
brings wisdom to the ‘eco’ understood to be one’s home, environment, place. The fun-
damental idea of ecosophy is the ability to live in harmony with nature, hence requires
prudence and wisdom. Other important principles include biospheric egalitarianism, and
self-realization (Sylvan and Bennett, 1994).
Biospheric egalitarianism gives value to all forms of life. All life has intrinsic value. An
interesting component of deep ecology is that ’life’ is not only confined to human and non-
human beings. Life is what rivers, mountains, and entire ecosystems have. This maxim
has been a constant criticism of the deep ecology movement. Sylvan argues that the term
’biosphere’ is a misnomer since it gives life to non-living entities too. It is also unrealistic
to assume that all living and non-living beings can and should be treated equally. Naess
recognized this and qualified the idea by stating that the notion of equality was good in
2This is only applicable in a shallow ethic, an intermediate ethic does extend the value to non-human
beings.
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principle only. However, for Sylvan this is inadequate. Any theory needs to be applicable
too. As such, it becomes an empty maxim (Sylvan, 1985).
Self-realization for deep ecologists is not only the realization of self, but an understand-
ing of self as part of the ecosphere. Who we are, and what we do cannot be thought of as
separate from our connection and interdependency with the environment. Self-realization
in this context does not promote selfishness, but rather a more collective notion of self.
For Sylvan, deep ecology theory is analytically weak and not well articulated. The absence
of an adequate theorization of self gives rise to a weak understanding of self-realization.
Around the same time that deep ecology was introduced Sylvan and Plumwood put forward
their deep-green theory. This is the topic for the next section.
Deep-Green Theory
Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan are recognized as two brilliant Australian philosophers.
Their contributions have not been limited to environmental philosophy, their work extends
to logic, metaphysics, and more. They made their mark with the publication of their
book, The Fight for the Forests, first published in 1973. A book, which strongly criticized
Australia’s forest policy, became a bible for many environmental activists since it offered an
eloquent critique from both an economic and philosophical perspective. As to be expected,
the book was not well received within the Australian National University and in particular
the Forestry Department where many national policies originated. According to Dominic
Hyde,3 “The book’s critical and “pugilistic” stance caused uproar in Forestry circles and its
anticipated publication” (2014, p.14). This book laid the foundation for their deep-green
theory, which Richard Sylvan later further developed.
Deep-green theory is now recognised as a deep environmental theory offering a different
paradigm from the prevailing philosophical one that is restricted to a shallow environmental
ethic. While deep-green theory can be deemed similar to deep ecology, there are also
many contrasts. The main principle that both share is the complete rejection of human
chauvinism. Both theories discuss the intrinsic value of all living beings, and, if you
like, non- living beings such as rivers, forests, mountains, and so forth. But while deep
ecology espouses the principle of biospheric egalitarianism, deep-green theory does not.
A principal difference between deep-green theory and deep ecology is that the former’s
theoretical underpinnings are completely philosophical, where as in deep ecology, they are
philosophical and religious. This difference is significant because what Plumwood and
Sylvan offer is a well articulated and analytical framework, based on logical arguments and
reasoning, separate from relativist positions that some religions defend.
Deep-green theory attempts to alter the ethical paradigm from which shallow and in-
termediate ethics cannot escape from. This ethical paradigm is still human-centered, so
3Dominic Hyde has written a splendid book on the lives of Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan titled,
Eco-logical Lives: The Philosophical Lives of Richard Routley/Sylvan and Val Routley/Plumwood.
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regardless of whether you consider a non-anthropocentric position, because this is still
enshrined within a human-centered ethical paradigm it only perpetuates a form of an-
thropocentrism. An ethical paradigm in deep-green theory does not essentially appeal to
humans, or other groups based on features such as sentience. It demands a complete shift
in perspective. The new focus should be categorical distinctions that are morally relevant
(Sylvan and Bennett, 1994).
As a response to deep ecology’s unsatisfactory biospheric egalitarianism, Sylvan and
Bennett (1994) offer the principle of eco-impartiality. This principle is based on the notion
that there would be no significant differential treatment of anything human/non-human.
This allows for the fact that although all living and non-living things do have intrinsic
value, this does not demand that they are all treated equally. As Sylvan says, “impartial
treatment does not entail equal treatment, or equal consideration, and does not require
equal intrinsic value or other value” (p.142).
Deep-green theory is broader in its perspective for as well as considering ethics and
axiology, it also includes the need for a more radical socio-political theory. It is not only
concerned with strictly environmental issues but also those that are environmentally rele-
vant, such as peace and war, nuclear energy, poverty and hunger, non-human beings and
their habitats and so forth. With this, comes the need to transform political structures
otherwise we go nowhere. And this is where I want to go next, to discuss what is currently
happening politically with the environmental agenda and why I think deep-green theory
could help us get out of this quagmire.
Environmentalism Today
As I write this, Donald Trump, President of the United States, withdraws from the Paris
Climate Accord, and the Queensland Government has just signed an agreement with Adani
mining company to go ahead with Australia’s biggest proposed coal mine (The Guardian,
2017). In a period where scientists caution against the continued exploitation of fossil
fuels, and encourage research and investment in renewable energies, two countries, decide
to ignore the science and invest in energy sources that are guaranteed to deepen the envi-
ronmental crisis and destroy already fragile environments such as the Great Barrier Reef
to defend national economic interests. Sylvan talks about the Great Barrier Reef as one of
the many environmental riches of Australia. What would he say today, as we witness the
coral bleaching and irreversible damage of the Reef. He cautioned against environmental
complacency, arguing that all was not well, however it seems that this environmental com-
placency is one causative factor for the environmental damage we see today (Sylvan and
Bennett, 1994).
Australia, once recognized as a vanguard in the environmental movement for its invest-
ment in renewable energy back in the 70s, has now, become environmentally stagnant.4
4I grew up in Australia and once I began traveling to other countries during the 80s, I realized how
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Sylvan and Bennett (1994) described Australia as a bellwether territory, “It is estimated
that Australia has more members of environmental groups in relative terms than almost any
comparable country” (p. 54). Despite this, according to The Climate Institute, Australia
is the worst polluter per head among developed countries. Since 1971, carbon dioxide emis-
sions have nearly tripled and we have seen a decline in the use of renewable energy. This is
in a country with much potential for wind and solar energy. On the heels of the U.S. is the
promotion of a lifestyle that is unsustainable. Unfortunately, Australia’s economy has been
built on the exploitation of natural resources, and resource-intensive agriculture. A carbon
tax implemented in 2012, was quickly overturned in 2014 with the change of government.
So, rather than environmental policy gaining momentum, environmental protection has
been minimized (The Climate Institute, 2017).
The latest report by the Global Carbon Project claims that fossil fuel emissions have
risen 2% globally in 2017. To be able to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, global
emissions need to decline now, so that the projected net zero global emissions after 2050
become a reality. In the U.S. it is projected that coal consumption will rise slightly in 2017,
the first time in many years (The Conversation, 2017).
A newly released report from the Australian Federal Government, the Climate Policy
Review shows scant serious commitment to reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Rebecca Pearse
regards this new report as just reflecting Australia’s weak climate policy. She says, “The
Climate Policy Review is also not surprising because it continues a longstanding, bipartisan
tradition in weak climate policy formulation. It echoes four enduring features of Australia’s
ineffective climate policies since the 1990s.” These four features are: pursuing a weak
emissions target; loosening obligations for industry; shifting the heavy lifting elsewhere
and a unperceived role for governments in planning and building a low-carbon economy.
One can plainly see that the paradigm from which climate and other environmental policies
emerge are strictly within a shallow environmental ethic, if an ethic at all. The focus is
essentially anthropocentric with little concern for the well-being or sustainability of the
entire ecosphere, except in the interests and benefits of humans (The Conversation, 2017).
An environmental impact analysis of the proposed Adani coal mine has concluded that
possible impacts include negatively affecting the water table of the Great Artesian Basin;
reducing the habitat for wildlife and endangering species such as the ornamental snake,
squatter pigeons and the black throated finch; increases the possibility of coral disease
and ultimately, significantly increases greenhouse emissions. These can all be considered
unintended consequences, however, we have reached a stage, that as a result of unintended
consequences over the last couple of centuries, we are now witnessing a desperate global
environmental crisis. We can no longer devise any project that will impact the environment
in any way, without attempting to anticipate some likely negative consequences and make
advanced Australia was in regard to environmental policy particularly in the case of green energy/housing,
recycling, etc.. As the years have progressed (and not living in Australia) I have become increasingly
disappointed to see the lack of progress Australia has made in environmental policy and is no longer a
global leader in green energy, etc. (when it has the resources to do so).
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responsible decisions. Otherwise, it is irresponsible and morally wrong.
The U.S. is currently not in a better position. The president, Donald Trump, has
recently proposed allowing offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic and other coastal
waters. The North Dakota Access Pipeline has gone ahead despite protests from Native
American tribal groups and environmental activists. The Keystone pipeline is also going
forward. EPA regulations to set tougher emissions are threatened and the list goes on. The
consequences, intended and unintended will likely impact sacred grounds, habitats, water
sources and so on. There is a desperate need for a paradigm shift from a shallow environ-
mental ethic to one consistent with deep-green theory. Before I enter into a discussion into
what that paradigm may look like, I would like to spend some time thinking about why
we are still stuck in this weak one.
Environmental Ethics Still on the Margins and the Need for
Helpful Philosophy
In the preface of the book, The Greening of Ethics, the authors say the following, “the
biosphere, as a system capable of supporting versatile and diverse life forms satisfactorily,
will not tolerate indefinitely present patterns of energy and resource use, waste production
and life-support-systems degradation, by concentrated human communities. Conditions for
satisfactory lives for many species, including humankind, will deteriorate further in the next
century, perhaps disastrously, unless some fundamental changes are made, and made soon,
to these patterns. Ideas and motivation for such fundamental changes, for an environmental
transvaluation of widespread basic values, are accordingly needed, desperately needed,”
(p.5). The authors go on to say in the book and in other sources,5 that these ideas
and motivation should come from environmental ethics, and philosophy in general. Sylvan
argues that philosophy is to blame for the way it has promoted certain ideologies embedded
within enlightenment ideas of rationality that are completely anthropocentric.
Using global development6 as an analogy, one can compare how problems that arise
in the practice of global development are also evident in thinking about the environment.
The principal obstacles for global development are not based on scientific fact or evidence.
They are attributable to a gross abandonment and ignorance of other factors such as:
national interests, power and domination, skewed values, attitudes, among others. And
since these occur at the structural level as much as the individual level it will be very
difficult to budge or if you like transform these structures. The same can be said for issues
concerning the environment. Thinking that we can address environmental degradation
purely by individual behaviour is delusional, it is a necessary but insufficient condition.
But just like global development, if we do not at least bring the issues to the surface and
5See Sylvan (2010).
6By global development, I mean development which is directed at ameliorating the living conditions for
those living in disadvantaged and vulnerable situations.
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make them visible, then we go nowhere.
Development ethics is a sub-discipline of ethics that responds to challenges and com-
plexities that arise in the field of global development. David Crocker gives an example
of food aid to show how reducing the problem of food aid to only the provision of food,
without taking into consideration more complex issues such as hunger and poverty provides
an inadequate analysis of the problem. Crocker argues that Peter Singer demonstrates this
blinkered vision since he has argued for many years about the moral obligations individuals
have in helping those in more disadvantaged situations. His argument is restricted to purely
individual terms. Crocker says, “These thinkers paid scant attention to food aid policies
of rich countries or development policies in poor countries. And they mostly neglected the
efforts of poor countries to feed and develop their own people.” (2008, p.256). Having
taken a critical look and understood the food aid policies of the 1970s, Singer would have
discovered that these were problematic in a moral sense, and desperately needed reform.
Philosophers, policymakers, and citizens still abstract one part – food aid – from the whole
complex of hunger, poverty, and bad development, and proceed to consider that part in
isolation from other dimensions (Crocker, 2008, p.258). To put it into context for the
environment, abstracting an environmental change such as building the Adani coal mine
without considering other dimensions such as the level of harm to the water table and
wildlife habitat, coral disease, and to increasing levels of greenhouse emissions reflects this
same inadequacy.
For Sylvan’s deep green theory to be successful, this will necessarily require the active
involvement of philosophers. It is not enough that philosophical thinking be instilled into
environmental issues but philosophers need to become engaged in the theory and practice
of environmentalism. Jonathan Wolff, a philosopher who has worked extensively in the
area of ethics and public policy says the following, “Public policy needs philosophers more
than it needs philosophy” (2011, p.202). However, philosophers need to be careful not to
appear as the “moralists” and patronizing or isolate the field. As St. Clair succinctly says,
Many in the field of applied ethics have become aware of the need to avoid the mistakes of
other fields, where ethical reflection has run parallel and often totally dissociated from the
world of action, and from the world of policy (2007, p.147).
At the time Sylvan was writing The Greening of Ethics, he also noted that “environ-
mental ethics and environmental philosophy have been unable to gain more than occasional
marginal status in philosophy curricula” (1994, p.11). I would like to think the situation
is better now, there seem to be more courses on environmental philosophy offered in uni-
versities, and applied fields such as environmental ethics, health care ethics, development
ethics are gaining more ground, but there is still much more we can do. There is something
to be said about doing helpful philosophy.
It is also the case that by relegating the sub-discipline of environmental ethics to only
professionals who are primarily natural and social scientists, there is a risk that ethics
in this context is not only succumbed to a lessened intellectual rigor, but also a diluted,
reductionist view is given to it. Stephen Toulmin wrote how the field of bioethics in fact
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saved ethics by shifting the primary locus from the study to the bedside. His piece on the
recovery of practical philosophy argues that in areas such as medicine and criminal justice,
specialists such as psychiatrists, lawyers and judges, in addressing general philosophical
problems usually do so incompetently. Hence, “there is important work for philosophers
to do in conjunction with such specialists” (1988, p.349). Therefore, the importance of
philosophers to actively engage in environmental ethics. This is something that Sylvan
writes about too. He considers that often a field ethics such as environmental ethics is based
too much on case studies without connecting it to ethical theory. Also, field practitioners
are not generally trained in ethical theory and many do not have the adequate analytical
skills to evaluate ethical situations effectively.7
Michael Nelson, an environmental philosopher considers that for philosophers to suc-
ceed in doing helpful philosophy two conditions need to be met. First, in the case of
environmental issues, “philosophers need to continue to convince ecologists (and others) of
the relevance of philosophical and ethical discourse” (2008, p.612). Just making known the
ethical dimensions of problems in the case of the environment “is not, in and of itself, suf-
ficient” (2008, p.612). As Nelson says, “Relevance, helpfulness and interdisciplinarity are
not obtained merely by exposing the philosophical dimensions and dilemmas of a given dis-
cipline. It is, unfortunately more difficult than that” (2008, p.612). The second condition
Nelson claims necessary is the need for philosophers to work with environmental scien-
tists, social scientists and policy-makers. Working with is hugely different than working on
(p.612).
The role of philosophy is a greater understanding of everyday problems and illuminating
what really matters. I think this is our ultimate goal and is also consistent with Richard
Bernstein who writes about the praxis of philosophers. He says, “Our first task is to try
to understand and to understand in such a way that we can highlight what is important
and sound” (1971, p.8). I will argue that philosophers have a moral obligation and respon-
sibility to contribute to the problems of the environment, but in a way which is helpful.
Philosophers, at least traditional ones are not very good at working in a collaborative way.
This has been one of the obstacles to carrying out an interdisciplinary approach. To avoid
this type of theoretical limitation requires the need for philosophers to be careful when
applying their theories in the practice, especially if we are talking about abstract theories
and principles, and an area of practice grounded in action. Lisa Schwartzman argues “If
the stereotypes and biases held by individuals are ever going to change, the deeply rooted
systems of power that give rise to them will need to be understood and fundamentally
altered. Thus, philosophers must make critical social analysis an integral part of their the-
orizing” (2012, p.312). This is not so straightforward and demands a deeper understanding
of the issues one is writing about. This is not an impossible venture; it just requires some
professional humility and willingness to explore further, going beyond our own thoughts
7I make a similar argument in the case of development professionals in my dissertation: Global Devel-
opment and its Discontents: Rethinking the Theory and Practice.
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and knowledge.
Deep-Green Theory in Practice
Thinking about putting deep-green theory into practice should not seem an insurmountable
task. If it is true, that many people are now aware of the risks that lie ahead in regard
to the environment such as depleted land mass for humans and non-humans alike; the
further extinction of endangered species; water scarcity; food insecurity; the displacement
of people; severe weather conditions and resultant storms/disasters to mention a few, then
it is time to seriously consider our role as a part of the ecosphere. Let’s face it, a shallow or
an intermediate environmental ethic is insufficient to achieve the level of change required.
It will require a deep-green theory with a paradigm shift at the level of individuals, but
also at the level of institutions and social structures that uphold them. According to
Sylvan and Bennett (1994), It is deeper environmental ethics that should be developed
and promoted. It is a substantial change that is wanted. It is not just the stopping of
impending environmental disasters to humans that is required, but an appreciation of the
intrinsic value of other things that share the environment with humans that is needed
(p.179). Some of the ways Sylvan and Bennett propose that could encourage a cultural
paradigmatic shift include:
– teaching environmental ethics to children, making them aware of their existence as
part of a larger whole and the importance of caring for the earth;
– a stronger emphasis on ethics and ethical practice;
– change individual behavior: responsible consumption, simple living, recycling, ac-
tivism;
– responsible citizenship: boycotting industries that exploit and abuse environmental
parts and the whole; voting for elected officials who promote sound environmental
awareness, protection and policies;
– promoting and educating the general public on a deeper environmental ethic, thus
increasing awareness but also concern and a lobbying force to place pressure on
governments;
– control of the human population;8
8This may seem quite impossible without imposing some law as China did with their one child policy.
In fact, this is not the case, many studies have proven that the education of women correlates with lower
fertility rates. Therefore, an excellent strategy that would have multiple effects is aiming for the education
of all girls and women globally. This may seem to be a lofty goal, but is not really. It does not require
sophisticated technology or know how, just political will.
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– government policies that encourage environmental protection and place harder regu-
lations on the corporate sector;9
– governments that provide incentives for the promotion of deep-green environmental
practice to corporations;
– deep-green environmental ethics should be part of any environmental impact study;
If you think that all these strategies will be difficult to implement, it might be worth
remembering how we once thought about slavery, or homosexuality, or even the status of
women, and how far we have come in changing attitudes and values. Although we still
have a long way to go before we can say that we have achieved gender and racial equality,
we can say that the situation for women in western countries is much improved than what
it was one hundred years ago. The same could be said for people of color, and those of the
LGBTQ community.10 I think it’s worthwhile quoting what Sylvan and Bennett say about
this, “Changing to respectful approaches to the environment and supplanting the place of
humans in the world and their ethical systems may seem excessive and extreme. Yet what
is now seen as unthinkable, as the voice of extremism, will in a decade or two be seen as
necessity: what was extreme 10 years ago is now a balanced view” (p.184).
Take the topic of sexual harassment. I think we are currently at a watershed moment.
No-one can be completely surprised that sexual harassment is pervasive in our society.
However, what is interesting is that it is now being publicly exposed. This in time will
lead to a change in attitudes and behavior, but not so much because men will realize
they should not do it, but more for the reason that they can no longer get away with
it. Zero tolerance policies of sexual harassment in workplaces and other environments
are essential, but what is more urgent is mechanisms to allow women to report sexual
misconduct where they are listened to, and not silenced. Where they are not threatened
nor offered compensation for remaining silent, and where action is taken, and prosecution
if necessary against perpetrators. One of the reasons why corruption is so rife in poorer
countries is not so much due to people having lesser values, but more because as humans we
are all fallible (and men are at risk, particularly since our cultural paradigm is embedded
in patriarchy and condones certain behavior).11 People perform in corrupt ways in these
countries due to an absence of mechanisms and sanctions that regulate these activities.
9I would add that Governments should declare moratoriums on any projects that involve oil, gas and
coal exploration and extraction, but endeavor to encourage research on renewable and alternative energy
sources.
10Granted, the situation for women in other countries is still deplorable, as well as for some people of
color, different sexual orientation, and so forth. However, one of the reasons why attitudes have changed
in western countries has been due to social movements, and people from these groups, such as women,
speaking out and making oppression visible.
11For an interesting piece on sexual harassment and patriarchy, see Crossthwaite and Priest (1996).
Although written a number of years ago it is still relevant today.
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I would like to add two more things to Sylvan’s list that have emerged over the last few
years that may help push an agenda within a paradigm of deep-green environmental ethics.
These are responsible innovation and a steady-state economy. Responsible research and
innovation is an interdisciplinary initiative currently centered in Europe and North America
that provides a process and framework to promote research and technology that takes into
account anticipating outcomes, ensures inclusion of representation, critical reflection and
responsiveness.12 This process is consistent with a deep-green environmental ethic and
should be promoted as such. It encourages us to think about technology and innovation
in a more responsible way.
The second one is a steady-state economy. Mainstream economics has made us believe
that our economies need to consistently grow. The only way nation-states can prosper is by
ensuring a percentage of annual economic growth. Steady-state economics is an attempt
to debunk this myth, particularly if we are talking about a world with finite resources.
Steady-state economics also requires a paradigm shift from an empty-world economics to a
“full-world” economics. Herman Daly in his work on ecological economics uses these terms
to describe where we are at now. Our current world is full of us, and stuff (Daly, 2007).
The definition of a steady-state economy is, “an economy that aims to maintain a stable
level of resource consumption and a stable population. It’s an economy in which material
and energy use are kept within ecological limits, and in which the goal of increasing GDP is
replaced by the goal of improving quality of life,” (Dietz and O’Neill, p.45). A steady-state
economy is also consistent with deep-green theory.
The main impetus behind a steady-state economy is the evidence that our current eco-
nomic system and consistent pursuit of growth is unsustainable. We live in a world of finite
resources, this means that we cannot think of incessant growth. There will come a time
when we run out of natural resources. A steady-state economy is not only concerned with
limiting economic growth, the four key features include: sustainable scale, the limited use
of materials and energy; fair distribution, giving people equal opportunities to gain livable
incomes but also limiting inequality; efficient allocation of resources and a better quality
of life. Greater wealth does not correlate with greater happiness, the way to happiness
is not economic. The focus then for a steady-state economy is sustainability, equity and
well-being (Dietz and O’Neill). Bringing together initiatives such as responsible innovation
and steady-state economics can be seen as practical strategies that will allow for the theory
of a deep-green approach to become practice. But there is also something to be said for an
interdisciplinary approach, as well as a synergy between responsible innovation and steady-
state economics with deep-green theory. Something that should be taken advantage of. For
many, deep-green theory will seem too ethically demanding and unrealistic, especially for
those of us comfortable with our current lifestyles. For others, they might ask what impact
they could have as an individual. Others will say that simple living is not possible in our
materialist and consumerist society. And others will say that the rich are so set in their
12For more information about responsible innovation see the following: P. McNaughton et al., 2014.
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ways that they would not cede any of their luxuries and privileges.
For those who consider deep-green theory as too demanding and unrealistic, I think
we are left with no other choice. It is demanding in the sense that it will require a degree
of change in our attitudes and behavior, but if we are serious about trying to reduce our
human footprint, then there is no other way. For those who believe that their individual
impact will have no impact, consider Kant’s categorical imperative and thinking about it
as a universal principle. If 100 people decided to recycle all their recyclable items, as well as
reduce their use of them, this would have minimal impact. If 100,000 people decided to do
this, it would have more impact, but probably nothing significantly measurable. However,
if one billion people all decided to recycle all recyclable items, as well as reduce the use
of these items, then this would have measurable impact. We are all in this together, the
sooner we become aware of this the better.
Living simply does not necessarily mean that we have to lower our standards. What it
means is a re-thinking of our priorities and a change of focus from being materialist and
consumerist to one that is more concerned with the quality of our lives, and one which takes
into consideration future generations too. The focus is on being, rather than having.13 As
for the rich, being set in their ways and not being able to cede their luxurious lifestyles
and privileges. One can argue that we are all set in our ways. This does not preclude the
opportunity to change, particularly if we have a better understanding about something,
and particularly if done so within an ethical paradigm akin to deep-green theory. Let’s not
underestimate the potential and possibilities of others.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to bring to light the important contribution that Richard Syl-
van’s thinking on deep-green environmental ethics, together with Val Plumwood and David
Bennett has made on environmental philosophy, and will continue to do so. We can no
longer be complacent about the situation our world faces today. Each one of us has the re-
sponsibility to take some action. Sylvan’s deep-green theory offers a paradigm from which
to think through how, and what actions should be taken. I think it also provides a wake-up
call to philosophers, especially academic ones. In a way, we have built our own graves by
limiting our work and scope within our own ivory towers. We need more philosophers
like Sylvan and Plumwood. Philosophy and philosophers need to become more engaged
in issues such as the environment.14 The only way that Sylvan’s deep-green theory can
be realized into some sort of practice is by philosophers engaging with his theory in their
research, teaching and personal lives.
13For an article on living simply, see Gambrel and Cafaro, 2010.
14By this, I don’t mean all philosophers. Some areas of philosophy like logic and metaphysics do not lend
themselves to practical applications.
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